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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
This matter arises out of the bankruptcy of two lease 
financing corporations, which were allegedly operated as a 
"Ponzi scheme."1 Like all such schemes, this one collapsed, 
leaving numerous investors with significant losses. To 
operate the scheme, William Shapiro, aided by others, 
allegedly caused the corporations to issue fraudulent debt 
certificates, which were then sold to individual investors. 
When the corporations lost any reasonable prospect of 
repaying the outstanding debt, they filed for bankruptcy. 
 
A Committee of Creditors, appointed by a bankruptcy 
trustee, brought claims in the District Court on behalf of 
the two debtor corporations alleging that third-parties had 
fraudulently induced the corporations to issue the debt 
securities, thereby deepening their insolvency and forcing 
them into bankruptcy. These third-parties allegedly 
conspired with the debtors' management, who were also the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A "Ponzi scheme" is "[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which 
money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends 
for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger 
investments." Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed. 1999). 
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debtors' sole shareholders, in engineering the Ponzi 
scheme. On these allegations, the District Court concluded 
that it could not rule out the possibility of a cognizable 
injury. Nevertheless, the District Court held that the 
Committee lacked standing to assert its claims against the 
third-parties because of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The 
Committee appeals. 
 
We conclude that "deepening insolvency" constitutes a 
valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law and that 
the Committee therefore has standing to bring this action. 
However, evaluating the Committee's claims "as of the 
commencement" of the bankruptcy, we hold that because 
the Committee, standing in the shoes of the debtors, was in 
pari delicto with the third parties it is suing, its claims were 
properly dismissed. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
The following allegations are taken from the Amended 
Complaint of the appellant, the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors ("the Committee"), which was 
appointed by the bankruptcy trustee and which was 
authorized by stipulation to assert claims on behalf of the 
debtor corporations. The essence of the Committee's 
allegations is that the Shapiro family (or "the Shapiros"), 
with the assistance of other defendants, including third- 
party professionals,2 operated Walnut Equipment Leasing 
Company, Inc., ("Walnut"), and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Equipment Leasing Corporation of America ("ELCOA"), as a 
Ponzi scheme. 
 
The scheme originated with Walnut, which was owned by 
defendant Walnut Associates, Inc., and which, in turn, was 
owned by William Shapiro. In 1986, Walnut was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The sixteen defendants in the original case before the District Court 
are as follows: (1) William Shapiro, (2) Kenneth Shapiro, (3) DelJean 
Shapiro, (4) Lester Shapiro, (5) Nathan Tattar, (6) Adam Varrenti, Jr., 
(7) 
John Orr, (8) Philip Bagley, (9) Walnut Associates, Inc., (10) Welco, 
Inc., 
(11) The Law Offices of William Shapiro, Esq., P.C., (12) Financial Data, 
Inc., (13) Kenner Collection Agency, Inc., (14) Cogen, Sklar, L.L.P., (15) 
R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., and (16) Liss Financial Services, Inc. 
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experiencing financial difficulties. As a result, Walnut could 
not raise sufficient capital through the sale of debt 
securities. In a purported effort to secure more capital for 
Walnut, the Shapiro family organized ELCOA as "a limited 
purpose financing subsidiary," wholly owned by Walnut, to 
provide a platform to sell debt securities through a new 
company with a clean financial picture. 
 
According to the Amended Complaint, ELCOA was 
fraudulently marketed as an independent business entity, 
even though its only function was to acquire leases from 
Walnut and to sell debt certificates to raise money. In 
reality, Walnut and ELCOA were part of a network of 
businesses owned and operated by the Shapiro family. This 
network included defendants Welco, Inc., The Law Offices 
of William Shapiro, Esq., P.C., Walnut Associates, Inc., 
Financial Data, Inc., and Kenner Collection Agency, Inc. As 
part of the scheme to keep this network afloat, the Shapiros 
allegedly misstated Walnut and ELCOA's financial position 
in order to induce these companies to register, offer, and 
sell additional debt certificates to raise capital. Numerous 
investors purchased the ELCOA debt securities, and the 
Committee claims that the Shapiros funneled those monies 
into Walnut. At the same time, the Shapiros and their co- 
conspirators continued receiving salaries and fees from 
Walnut and ELCOA. Moreover, the issuance of debt 
securities allegedly deepened the insolvency of Walnut and 
ELCOA, and put them on the path to bankruptcy. 
 
The Amended Complaint states that certain third-party 
professionals were essential to the Shapiro family's 
operation, namely, their counsel, defendant William 
Shapiro, Esq. P.C., their accountant, defendant Cogen 
Sklar, L.L.P. ("Cogen"), and their qualified independent 
underwriters, defendant R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc. ("Lafferty"), 
and defendant Liss Financial Services, Inc. ("Liss"). Each of 
these parties was responsible for professional opinions that 
served as prerequisites for the registration of each public 
offering and sale of ELCOA's debt securities. Each allegedly 
conspired with the Shapiro family to render opinions 
replete with multiple fraudulent misstatements and 
material omissions concerning Walnut and ELCOA's 
financial statements. The parties allegedly lacked any 
foundation for their conclusions. 
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Ultimately, the artifice collapsed, leading to the 
bankruptcies of Walnut and ELCOA, which became the 
debtor corporations (or "the Debtors"). The companies filed 
Chapter 11 petitions, and the Debtors' management, which 
included members of the Shapiro family and their co- 
conspirators, were removed. The Bankruptcy Court then 
appointed a bankruptcy trustee. Thereafter, the trustee, 
pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. S 1102, appointed the Committee to represent the 
claims of unsecured creditors in connection with the 
bankruptcy proceedings. The Committee is comprised 
entirely of creditors; no member of the Debtors' former 
management is present. 
 
On January 19, 1999, the Bankruptcy Court approved a 
Stipulation between the Committee and the Debtors 
authorizing, among other things, "the Committee to 
commence and prosecute . . . [l]itigation on behalf of the 
Debtors' estates." Stipulation Among the Debtors and the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Debtors 
Authorizing the Committee to Commence Litigation on Behalf 
of the Debtors' Estates, Bankr. No. 97-19699-DWS, at *2 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1999). Under the Stipulation, the 
Committee effectively acquired all the attributes of a 
bankruptcy trustee for purposes of this case. See In re The 
Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he 
Committee, while not a trustee in bankruptcy, is in a 
position analogous to a trustee because it is suing on 
behalf of the debtor."). 
 
On February 1, 1999, the Committee, on behalf of the 
Debtors' estates, commenced a civil action in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the 
Debtors' officers, directors, affiliated companies (the 
Shapiro family and their network of companies), and 
outside professionals (Cogen and Lafferty) on the ground 
that the defendants, through their mismanagement of the 
Debtors and their participation in a fraudulent scheme, had 
"wrongfully expanded the [D]ebtors' debt out of all 
proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately forced the 
[D]ebtors to seek bankruptcy protection." The Committee 
brought claims against the Shapiros and their alleged co- 
conspirators -- including Cogen and Lafferty -- based upon 
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violations of federal securities laws, as well as common law 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation, mismanagement 
and breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, 
professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty. In addition, the Committee brought claims 
against some defendants -- DelJean Shapiro, Lester 
Shapiro, Adam Varrenti, Jr., John Orr, and Philip Bagley -- 
in their capacity as directors of either Walnut or ELCOA or 
both, asserting that they had mismanaged and breached 
their fiduciary duties to the Debtors by allegedly failing to 
supervise and oversee the Debtors' affairs. 
 
All defendants (except Liss, who failed to appear) moved 
to dismiss the Committee's Amended Complaint or, 
alternatively, for summary judgment. On September 8, 
1999, the District Court dismissed the claims against 
Cogen and Lafferty, reasoning that, "[s]ince it is pleaded 
that the [D]ebtors, acting through the Shapiros, perpetrated 
the Ponzi scheme . . . the doctrine of in pari delicto . . . bars 
[the Committee] from suing these defendants for claims 
arising out of the fraud." Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors v. William Shapiro, et al., No. 99-526, slip op. at 
11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1999). At the same time, however, the 
District Court denied the motion to dismiss as to the other 
defendants on the ground that in pari delicto  did not 
preclude claims against corporate insiders. Id.  at 12. 
Thereafter, the court severed the Committee's claims 
against Cogen and Lafferty, and the Committee appealed 
the dismissal of those claims. Cogen has settled with the 
Committee, leaving Lafferty as the only appellee. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the case under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1334(b). We have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
We have plenary review over the District Court's 
dismissal of the Committee's claims against Lafferty. See 
Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000). 
We apply the same standard used by the District Court, 
namely, we must determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the pleadings, the Committee may be entitled to 
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relief, accepting as true all well pleaded allegations in the 
Amended Complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the Committee. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 
(3d Cir. 1996). The District Court's order granting the 
motion to dismiss will be affirmed only if it appears that the 
Committee can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to 
relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 
III. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we believe that the District 
Court's conception of the standing issue in this case was 
somewhat flawed. The District Court stated that both 
cognizable injury and the doctrine of in pari delicto were 
elements of the standing analysis. Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors, No. 99-526, slip op. at 6. This 
formulation, however, was incorrect. In general,"[s]tanding 
consists of both a `case or controversy' requirement 
stemming from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and 
a subconstitutional `prudential' element." See The Pitt News 
v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000). An analysis of 
standing does not include an analysis of equitable defenses, 
such as in pari delicto. Whether a party has standing to 
bring claims and whether a party's claims are barred by an 
equitable defense are two separate questions, to be 
addressed on their own terms. See In re Dublin Secs., Inc., 
133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997) (analyzing in pari delicto 
separately from standing). 
 
That said, we will address both doctrines because, 
together, they formed the basis of the District Court's 
judgment. As a threshold requirement, standing demands 
our initial attention. See Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1982) (discussing the fundamental 
requirement of standing). Citing Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975), for the proposition that standing requires 
a "distinct and palpable injury," Lafferty argues that the 
Committee lacks standing because the Debtors have not 
sustained a "cognizable injury" separate and apart from any 
injury sustained by investors who had purchased the 
Debtors' debt securities. As such, Lafferty maintains that 
the Committee may not bring those claims under the 
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Supreme Court's decision in Caplin v. Marine Midland 
Grace Trust Co., in which the Court held that a bankruptcy 
trustee has no standing to assert claims on behalf of an 
estate's creditors. See 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972). 
 
Lafferty made the same argument to the District Court, 
which rejected it on the ground that, at the motion to 
dismiss stage, the court could not foreclose the existence of 
a separately cognizable injury to the Debtors 
distinguishable from the injuries suffered by purchasers of 
the Debtors' certificates: 
 
       Here, the Committee is suing on behalf of the bankrupt 
       debtor corporations [Walnut and ELCOA] -- not on 
       behalf of the creditors themselves. The injury alleged is 
       that "the debtors were fraudulently induced to register, 
       offer and sell certificates when insolvent and thus 
       without ability to repay their obligations to investors. 
       As a result, the debtors' outstanding debt was 
       continually expanded out of all proportion with their 
       ability to repay, forcing them into bankruptcy." Compl. 
       PP 1, 77. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       Defendants Cogen [ ] and Lafferty maintain that the 
       alleged Ponzi scheme claims belong exclusively to the 
       creditors, citing Hirsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 72 
       F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1995). [However, I believe that, 
       w]hile the most obvious damages were those sustained 
       by the creditors who purchased certificates [and 
       securities], the possibility of a distinct and separate 
       injury to the debtor corporations cannot be eliminated at 
       this stage. See In re Plaza Mortg. and Fin. Corp., 187 
       B.R. 37, 41 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (denying motion to dismiss 
       trustee's claims against accountants who participated 
       in Ponzi scheme and distinguishing Hirsch where only 
       allegation of injury was "unpaid obligations of the 
       debtor to the creditors"). 
 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, No. 99-526, slip. 
op. at 5, 7 (emphasis added). 
 
We agree with the District Court's evaluation. With the 
exception of a single federal securities law claim, the 
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Committee brought only state common law claims on behalf 
of the Debtors. According to the Amended Complaint, the 
defendants (including Lafferty), through their alleged fraud 
and participation in the scheme, injured the Debtors by 
"wrongfully expand[ing] the [D]ebtors' debt out of all 
proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately forc[ing] 
the [D]ebtors to seek bankruptcy protection." In other 
words, the Committee alleges an injury to the Debtors' 
corporate property from the fraudulent expansion of 
corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life. This type 
of injury has been referred to as "deepening insolvency." 
See, e.g., ALI-ABA Course of Study, Proximate Cause, 
Foreseeability, and Deepening Insolvency in Accountants' 
Liability Litigation, C994 ALI-ABA 201, 203 (1995). 
 
As far as the state law claims are concerned, it is clear 
that, to the extent Pennsylvania law recognizes a cause of 
action for the Debtors against Lafferty, the Committee can 
demonstrate the injury required for standing to sue in 
federal court. Given Lafferty's arguments, the standing 
analysis then consists of three inquiries: (1) whether the 
Committee is merely asserting claims belonging to the 
creditors, (2) whether "deepening insolvency" is a valid 
theory giving rise to a cognizable injury under Pennsylvania 
state law, and (3) whether, as Lafferty contends, the injury 
is merely illusory. 
 
A. Whether the Committee is merely asserting claims 
belonging to creditors 
 
Whether a right of action belongs to the debtor or to 
individual creditors is a question of state law. Hirsch v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995). 
In Pennsylvania, as in almost every other state,"a 
corporation is a distinct and separate entity, irrespective of 
the persons who own all its stock." Barium Steel Corp. v. 
Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1954) (citations omitted); 
accord In re Erie Drug Co., 204 A.2d 256, 257 (Pa. 1964). 
From this principle arises a distinction between the 
property of a corporation and that of others. For example, 
with respect to shareholders, 
 
       [t]he fact that one person owns all of the stock does not 
       make him and the corporation one and the same 
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       person, nor does he thereby become the owner of all 
       the property of the corporation. The shares of stock of 
       a corporation are essentially distinct and different from 
       the corporate property. 
 
Barium Steel, 108 A.2d at 341 (citations omitted); see also 
Meitner v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 275 A.2d 417, 419 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) (stating that "officers of 
corporations are not deemed to be the owners of corporate 
property even to the extent that they are shareholders"). 
 
The legal fiction of corporate existence corresponds with 
the view that an injury to the corporate body is legally 
distinct from an injury to another person. Thus, it is well 
established, under Pennsylvania law, that where fraud, 
mismanagement, or other wrong damages a corporation's 
assets, a shareholder does not have a direct cause of 
action. Burdon v. Erskine, 401 A.2d 369, 370-71 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1979) (citation omitted). Rather, it is the 
corporate body that suffers the primary wrong and, 
consequently, it is the corporate body that possesses the 
right to sue. John L. Motley Assoc., Inc. v. Rumbaugh, 104 
B.R. 683, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citations omitted) 
(describing Pennsylvania law). Thus, "an action to redress 
injuries to the corporation cannot be maintained by an 
individual shareholder, but must be brought as a derivative 
action in the name of the corporation." Id.  (citations 
omitted) (describing Pennsylvania law); see also  12 
Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence Business 
Relationships S 7:90 (2d ed. 1993) ("creditors claiming a 
beneficial interest in the corporation . . . may not[even] 
maintain a derivative action"). 
 
It follows from this discussion that a corporation can 
suffer an injury unto itself, and any claim it asserts to 
recover for that injury is independent and separate from the 
claims of shareholders, creditors, and others. We think it is 
irrelevant that, in bankruptcy, a successfully prosecuted 
cause of action leads to an inflow of money to the estate 
that will immediately flow out again to repay creditors: 
 
       The . . . assertion that this action will benefit creditors 
       is not an admission that this action is being brought 
       on their behalf. In a liquidation case, it is 
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       commonplace for a trustee to pursue an action on 
       behalf of the debtor in order to obtain a recovery 
       thereon for the estate. If the trustee is successful in the 
       action, the recovery which he obtains becomes property 
       of the estate and is then distributed pursuant to the 
       scheme established by S 726(a). Simply because the 
       creditors of a[n] estate may be the primary or even the 
       only beneficiaries of such a recovery does not 
       transform the action into a suit by the creditors. 
       Otherwise, whenever a lawsuit constituted property of 
       an estate which has insufficient funds to pay all 
       creditors, the lawsuit would be worthless since under 
       Caplin it could not be pursued by the trustee. 
 
In re: Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486, 506 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1999); accord Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 
(7th Cir. 1995) ("That the return would benefit the limited 
partners is just to say that anything that helps a 
corporation helps those who have claims against its 
assets."). 
 
In the instant case, the Committee sought recovery of 
damage to the Debtors' property from "deepening 
insolvency." We see no indication that the Committee is 
attempting to recover for injuries to the creditors. Cf. 
Caplin, 406 U.S. at 434 (holding that a trustee may not 
assert claims on behalf of creditors). Therefore, accepting 
the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the Committee, we conclude that the 
claims here belong to the Debtors, rather than to the 
creditors. 
 
B. Whether "deepening insolvency" is a valid theory that 
       gives rise to a cognizable injury under state law  
 
Having established that the Committee brought claims on 
behalf of the Debtors, rather than the creditors, we must 
now determine whether the alleged theory of injury-- 
"deepening insolvency" -- is cognizable under Pennsylvania 
law. Neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor any 
intermediate Pennsylvania court has directly addressed this 
issue. In the absence of an opinion from the state's highest 
tribunal, we must don the soothsayer's garb and predict 
how that court would rule if it were presented with the 
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question. See Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 
F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, because no state or 
federal courts have interpreted Pennsylvania law on this 
subject, we will rely predominantly on decisions 
interpreting the law of other jurisdictions and on the policy 
underlying Pennsylvania tort law to make this prediction. 
See Gruber v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 899 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting possible sources of authority for 
making a prediction). 
 
Drawing guidance from these authorities, we conclude 
that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would determine that "deepening insolvency" may 
give rise to a cognizable injury. First and foremost, the 
theory is essentially sound. Under federal bankruptcy law, 
insolvency is a financial condition in which a corporation's 
debts exceed the fair market value of its assets. 11 U.S.C. 
S 101(32). Even when a corporation is insolvent, its 
corporate property may have value. The fraudulent and 
concealed incurrence of debt can damage that value in 
several ways. For example, to the extent that bankruptcy is 
not already a certainty, the incurrence of debt can force an 
insolvent corporation into bankruptcy, thus inflicting legal 
and administrative costs on the corporation. See  Richard A. 
Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 
487 (5th ed. 1996) ("[B]y issuing risky debt,[a corporation] 
give[s] lawyers and the court system a claim on the firm if 
it defaults."). When brought on by unwieldy debt, 
bankruptcy also creates operational limitations which hurt 
a corporation's ability to run its business in a profitable 
manner. See id. at 488-89. Aside from causing actual 
bankruptcy, deepening insolvency can undermine a 
corporation's relationships with its customers, suppliers, 
and employees. The very threat of bankruptcy, brought 
about through fraudulent debt, can shake the confidence of 
parties dealing with the corporation, calling into question 
its ability to perform, thereby damaging the corporation's 
assets, the value of which often depends on the 
performance of other parties. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing 
Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction 
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 
1461, 1479-80 (1993). In addition, prolonging an insolvent 
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corporation's life through bad debt may simply cause the 
dissipation of corporate assets. 
 
These harms can be averted, and the value within an 
insolvent corporation salvaged, if the corporation is 
dissolved in a timely manner, rather than kept afloat with 
spurious debt. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Schacht 
v. Brown: 
 
       [C]ases [that oppose "deepening insolvency"] rest[ ] 
       upon a seriously flawed assumption, i.e., that the 
       fraudulent prolongation of a corporation's life beyond 
       insolvency is automatically to be considered a benefit 
       to the corporation's interests. This premise collides 
       with common sense, for the corporate body is 
       ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, 
       through increased exposure to creditor liability. Indeed, 
       in most cases, it would be crucial that the insolvency of 
       the corporation be disclosed, so that shareholders may 
       exercise their right to dissolve the corporation in order to 
       cut their losses. Thus, acceptance of a rule which 
       would bar a corporation from recovering damages due 
       to the hiding of information concerning its insolvency 
       would create perverse incentives for wrong-doing 
       officers and directors to conceal the true financial 
       condition of the corporation from the corporate body as 
       long as possible. 
 
711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Growing acceptance of the deepening insolvency theory 
confirms its soundness. In recent years, a number of 
federal courts have held that "deepening insolvency" may 
give rise to a cognizable injury to corporate debtors. See, 
e.g., id. (applying Illinois law and holding that, where a 
debtor corporation was fraudulently continued in business 
past the point of insolvency, the liquidator had standing to 
maintain a civil action under racketeering law); Hannover 
Corp. of America v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854-55 (M.D. 
La. 1997) (applying Louisiana law and stating that"a 
corporation can suffer injury from fraudulently extended 
life, dissipation of assets, or increased insolvency"); Allard 
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 
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1996) (applying New York law and stating that, as to suit 
brought by bankruptcy trustee, "[b]ecause courts have 
permitted recovery under the `deepening insolvency' theory, 
[defendant] is not entitled to summary judgment as to 
whatever portion of the claim for relief represents damages 
flowing from indebtedness to trade creditors"); In re Gouiran 
Holdings, Inc., 165 B.R. 104, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying 
New York law, and refusing to dismiss claims brought by a 
creditors' committee because it was possible that,"under 
some set of facts two years of negligently prepared financial 
statements could have been a substantial cause of[the 
debtor] incurring unmanageable debt and filing for 
bankruptcy protection"); Feltman v. Prudential Bache 
Securities, 122 B.R. 466, 473 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that 
an " `artificial and fraudulently prolonged life . . . and . . . 
consequent dissipation of assets' constitutes a recognized 
injury for which a corporation can sue under certain 
conditions", but concluding that there was no injury on the 
facts). Some state courts have also recognized the 
deepening insolvency theory. See, e.g., Herbert H. Post & 
Co. v. Sidney Bitterman, Inc., 219 A.D. 2d 214 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1st Dep't 1996) (applying New York law and allowing a 
malpractice claim for failing to detect embezzlement that 
weakened a company, which already was operating at a 
loss, thereby causing default on loans and forcing 
liquidation); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co. , 149 A.D. 2d 
165, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1989) (applying New York 
law and allowing claims for causing a company to"assume 
additional risks and thereby increase the extent of its 
exposure to creditors"). 
 
Significantly, one of the most venerable principles in 
Pennsylvania jurisprudence, and in most common law 
jurisdictions for that matter, is that, where there is an 
injury, the law provides a remedy. See 37 Pennsylvania 
Law Encyclopedia, Torts S 4, at 120 (1961) ("For every legal 
wrong there must be a correlative legal right.") (citation 
omitted). Thus, an identifiable and compensable injury is 
essential to the existence of tort liability, Schweitzer v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985), 
but once an injury has occurred, "tort law attempts to place 
the injured party in the same position he occupied before 
the injury," Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 625 F.2d 1095, 
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1104 (3d Cir. 1980) (construing Pennsylvania tort policy). 
Similarly, where a contractual "breach occurs, contract law 
seeks to give to the nonbreaching party the benefit of his or 
her bargain, to put him or her in the position he or she 
would have been in had there been no breach." 1 Summary 
of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence Torts S 1.1 (2d ed. 1999). 
Thus, where "deepening insolvency" causes damage to 
corporate property, we believe that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would provide a remedy by recognizing a 
cause of action for that injury. 
 
Lafferty challenges the strong rationales for recognizing 
an injury here, citing a few cases that it claims reject 
"deepening insolvency." In our view, the majority of these 
cases do not address "deepening insolvency," but rather, 
simply apply the Supreme Court's holding in Caplin that a 
bankruptcy trustee has no standing to assert claims on 
behalf of creditors. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (2d Cir. 1995); E.F. Hutton & 
Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 986-87 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Williams v. California 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th 
Cir. 1988). These decisions are not relevant to the present 
case because, as we explained earlier, the Committee is 
proceeding on behalf of the Debtors, not the creditors. 
Moreover, to the extent that either the cases cited by 
Lafferty or other cases suggest that a corporation may 
never sue to recover damages resulting from the fraudulent 
prolongation of its life past solvency, we believe, under the 
same analysis conducted by the Seventh Circuit in Schacht, 
that Pennsylvania courts would reject them. 
 
We pause here to consider the 19th century case of 
Patterson v. Franklin, 35 A. 205 (Pa. 1896), an arguably 
applicable decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 
Patterson, an assignee standing in the shoes of an insolvent 
corporation brought suit against the incorporators, claiming 
that they had allegedly made false representations in the 
statement of incorporation. Id. at 206. Apparently, the false 
representations had allowed the corporation to contract 
more debts. Id. On these allegations, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the assignee's 
claims, reasoning that, because the assignee had alleged 
that the corporation had benefitted from the 
representations, there was no viable cause of action. Id. 
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In our view, Patterson is not controlling here. The 
Patterson court never expressly considered the"deepening 
insolvency" theory, as the opinion does not indicate that the 
assignee presented any version of that argument to the 
court. In fact, it seems that the assignee in Patterson had 
not even alleged an injury to the corporation at all: 
 
       The fraud was perpetrated for its benefit. It was a 
       gainer, not a loser because of it. It was given a 
       considerable credit by the statement to which, as it is 
       alleged, it had no claim whatever. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, given the allegations in the 
case, it was perfectly reasonable for the court in Patterson 
to affirm the dismissal. See also Kinter v. Connolly, 81 A. 
905, 905 (Pa. 1911) (rejecting receiver's claim on behalf of 
the corporation against the directors for fraudulent 
statements that induced parties to do business with the 
corporation because "there [was] no averment that any act 
or omission of those of the defendants who demur caused 
loss or injury to the [corporation]."). 
 
Our reading of Patterson is informed in part by its age. In 
the hundred-plus years between that decision and the 
present, the business practices of corporations in the 
United States have changed quite dramatically. Likewise, 
society's understanding of corporate theory has grown. See 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the 
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471, 1482-1501 (1989) (describing the evolution of 
corporations over the last two centuries); see also Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 440-49 (2001) (describing 
the history of models for corporate structure and 
governance). Therefore, we decline to draw any broad 
principle from Patterson, a decision which did not directly 
address "deepening insolvency." 
 
In sum, we believe that the soundness of the theory, its 
growing acceptance among courts, and the remedial theme 
in Pennsylvania law would persuade the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to recognize "deepening insolvency" as 
giving rise to a cognizable injury in the proper 
circumstances. We now apply this conclusion to the 
allegations presented in this case. 
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C. Whether, as Lafferty contends, the injury is merely 
       illusory 
 
At oral argument, Lafferty observed that, under the Ponzi 
scheme alleged in the Committee's Amended Complaint, 
any fraudulent debt certificates issued by the Debtors 
would have created a capital flow into the Debtors, allowing 
them to pay the perpetrators of the fraud, the Shapiros, 
who were at the top of the pyramid. Stated in slightly 
different terms, we understand Lafferty to be saying that 
any injury to the Debtors caused by deepening insolvency 
might be considered illusory because that injury passed 
directly to the sole shareholders and wrongdoers, the 
Shapiro family. See, e.g., Feltman, 122 B.R. at 473-74 
(accepting "deepening insolvency" but concluding that, 
because a corporation was fictitious, any injury to it was 
illusory). As we discussed earlier, so long as the corporate 
form is respected, the alleged "deepening insolvency" injury 
to the property of the Debtors cannot be regarded as 
equivalent to the Shapiro family's shareholder interest. See 
Barium Steel, 108 A.2d at 341 (corporate property is 
distinct from shareholder property); John L. Motley Assoc., 
104 B.R. at 686-87 (causes of action for damage to 
corporate property belong to the corporation). Thus, we 
think that Lafferty is essentially asking us to disregard the 
corporate existence of Walnut, whose status separates the 
Debtors' property, and hence, the alleged injury from the 
Shapiro family's shareholder interest.3  
 
As a result, Lafferty's argument implicitly invokes the 
"piercing the corporate veil" doctrine, which treats a 
corporation and its shareholders as identical for purposes 
of suit, thereby imposing personal liability on shareholders. 
See Kiehl v. Action Mfg. Co., 535 A.2d 571, 574 (Pa. 1987). 
We doubt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
apply any form of the doctrine here. The present issue, after 
all, involves the defendant Lafferty invoking the doctrine to 
demonstrate the lack of injury to the Debtors, whereas in 
the standard scenario the plaintiff invokes the"piercing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The corporate existence of ELCOA is irrelevant to this inquiry because 
ELCOA was wholly owned by Walnut. It is Walnut's corporate existence 
that provides the legal fiction separating the Debtors from the Shapiros. 
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corporate veil" doctrine to impose liability on shareholders. 
Even assuming, for argument's sake, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would consider the merits of the corporate 
veil doctrine here, we think that, given the pleadings, the 
court would not disregard Walnut's corporate form and 
would not find the alleged injury to the Debtors to be 
illusory. 
 
In Pennsylvania, "courts will disregard the corporate 
entity only in limited circumstances when [the form is] used 
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or 
defend crime." Kiehl, 535 A.2d at 574. This is a stringent 
inquiry. "[C]ourt[s] must start from the general rule that the 
corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, unless 
specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception. . . . 
Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the 
entire theory of the corporate entity useless." Wedner v. 
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 296 A.2d 792, 
795 (Pa. 1972) (quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 
(3d Cir. 1967)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
The narrow circumstances in which Pennsylvania courts 
will disregard the corporate form are demonstrated by the 
number of cases, outside traditional attempts to impose 
liability on shareholders, that reject such arguments. See, 
e.g., Kiehl, 535 A.2d at 574-75 (refusing to disregard the 
corporate form between parents and subsidiaries when 
applying workmen's compensation laws); Wedner , 296 A.2d 
at 794-96 (reversing the determination of a board of 
unemployment compensation to ignore the corporate form 
to deny benefits to an employee shareholder); Shared 
Communications Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Boulevard, Inc. v. 
Bell Atlantic Props., Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 573-74 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997) (refusing, on a common law conspiracy claim, to 
ignore the legal corporate form between parents and wholly 
owned subsidiaries). 
 
We conclude, on the allegations presented here, that the 
circumstances for ignoring Walnut's corporate form do not 
exist with certainty. Although the Committee alleged in the 
Amended Complaint that the Shapiro family had made 
misrepresentations through Walnut, it did not allege that 
Walnut was a fictional or sham corporation. Cf. Feltman, 
122 B.R. at 473-74 (concluding that a deepening insolvency 
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injury was illusory because the debtor corporations were 
fictitious with no corporate identity separate from their sole 
shareholder). The Committee merely identified Walnut as 
an equipment leasing company, with no indication that 
Walnut's business activities, apart from its debt certificates, 
were anything but legitimate and real. Moreover, the record 
does not support a finding that corporate formalities were 
ignored. Although the Shapiros used Walnut to commit a 
fraud, the Committee has not alleged that Walnut lacked a 
corporate identity separate from the Shapiro family. 
 
Thus, accepting all of the Committee's allegations as true 
and reading them in the light most favorable to the 
Committee, we cannot state with certainty that Walnut's 
corporate existence should be disregarded such that any 
deepening insolvency injury was illusory. See Weston v. 
Commw. of Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001) 
("We will affirm a dismissal only if it appears certain that a 
plaintiff will be unable to support his claim."). We therefore 
agree with the District Court that the possibility of a 
distinct and separate injury to the Debtors cannot be ruled 
out at the motion to dismiss stage. 
 
Up until this point in our analysis of standing, we have 
spoken only in terms of the Committee's state law claims 
under Pennsylvania law. With regard to the Committee's 
single federal securities claim, we are confident that the 
principles we have elucidated are so well accepted that the 
analysis of that claim is the same. That is, insofar as 
alleged securities misrepresentations induced the Debtors 
to incur excessive debt which damaged corporate property, 
we think that the claim belongs to the Debtors, not to the 
creditors. Cf. Caplin, 406 U.S. at 434. Furthermore, for the 
reasons noted earlier, we believe "deepening insolvency" is 
generally a valid theory for federal law claims. See Schacht, 
711 F.2d at 1350. 
 
Thus, because the Committee properly asserts the claims 
of the Debtors, rather than the creditors, and because we 
recognize deepening insolvency as a valid theory giving rise 
to a claim under Pennsylvania law, we hold that the District 
Court did not err in concluding that the Committee had 
standing to bring the Debtors' claims against Lafferty. 
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IV. 
 
Having determined that the Committee has standing to 
bring the Debtors' claims, we now address Lafferty's 
assertion of the doctrine of in pari delicto as an affirmative 
defense against those claims. The doctrine of in pari delicto 
provides that a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a 
defendant if the plaintiff bears fault for the claim. See Feld 
and Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick and 
Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 548-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see also 
American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 International Importing 
Enterprises, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(under the in pari delicto doctrine, "a party is barred from 
recovering damages if his losses are substantially caused 
by activities the law forbade him to engage in"). Under 
Pennsylvania law (as well as federal law), in pari delicto is 
a doctrine of equity. See Peyton v. Margiotti , 156 A.2d 865, 
868 (Pa. 1959); Reynolds v. Boland, 52 A. 19, 21 (Pa. 1902). 
More generally, the broad idea captured by the doctrine 
may involve a number of different defenses, depending on 
whether a contract, tort, or other claim is asserted. We 
nevertheless can legitimately speak of one doctrine, in pari 
delicto, across the different claims because the analysis 
under the various causes of action will typically be the 
same. Judge Posner made this point in Cenco, Inc. v. 
Seidman & Seidman: 
 
       The challenged [jury] instructions relate to the question 
       whether Seidman was entitled to use the wrongdoing of 
       Cenco's managers as a defense against the charges of 
       breach of contract, negligence, and fraud [which] when 
       committed by auditors, are a single form of wrongdoing 
       under different names. . . . Because these theories of 
       auditors' misconduct are so alike, the defenses based 
       on misconduct of the audited firm or its employees are 
       also alike, though verbalized differently. A breach of 
       contract is excused if the promisee's hindrance or 
       failure to cooperate prevented the promisor from 
       performing the contract. The corresponding defense in 
       the case of negligence is, of course, contributory 
       negligence. . . . [And, in the fraud context, a] 
       participant in a fraud cannot also be a victim entitled 
       to recover damages, for he cannot have relied on the 
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       truth of the fraudulent representations, and such 
       reliance is an essential element in a case of fraud. 
 
686 F.2d 449, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). 
 
Whether the in pari delicto doctrine applies here depends 
on whether the Shapiro family's conduct can be imputed to 
the Debtors and hence to the Committee, which, under 
bankruptcy law, stands in the shoes of the Debtors. 
Imputation refers to the attribution of one person's 
wrongdoing to another person. For example, in the present 
case, the rules of imputation determine whether or not the 
Debtors will be deemed to have participated in wrongdoing 
because of the acts of the Debtors' management. If 
wrongdoing is imputed, then the in pari delicto  doctrine 
comes into play and bars a suit. 
 
In the present case, the District Court imputed the 
Shapiro family's wrongdoing to the Debtors and held that 
the Committee, standing in the shoes of the Debtors, was 
barred from bringing claims under the doctrine of in pari 
delicto. On appeal, the Committee argues that the District 
Court erred in discounting the Committee's status as an 
innocent successor when applying the in pari delicto 
defense. For support, the Committee relies primarily on In 
re: Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1999). The crux of its argument is that, under Pennsylvania 
law, courts may disallow the in pari delicto defense when its 
invocation would produce an inequitable result. See id. at 
504. According to the Committee, the fact of bankruptcy 
and the resulting removal of the Shapiro family and their 
co-conspirators from management prevents bad actors from 
benefitting from a recovery to the Debtors. Because only 
innocent creditors would now benefit from this suit, the 
Committee argues that the imputation of the Shapiro 
family's wrongdoing to the Debtors and the consequent 
application of the in pari delicto doctrine are unwarranted. 
 
The Committee's argument requires us to resolve two 
related questions. First, we must decide whether, when 
evaluating a claim brought by a bankruptcy trustee, a court 
of law may consider post-petition events that may affect an 
equitable defense, such as in pari delicto. Second, we must 
decide whether, in light of our answer to the first question, 
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the Shapiro family's conduct should in fact be imputed to 
the Debtors such that the doctrine of in pari delicto bars 
the Committee's claims. 
 
A. 
 
The first question is whether post-petition events may be 
considered when evaluating a claim in bankruptcy. At the 
outset, we note that the application of the in pari delicto 
doctrine is affected by the rules governing bankruptcies. 
The bankruptcy trustee -- or in this case the Committee -- 
is the representative of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 
U.S.C. S 323(a); In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 826 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (suggesting that, when a committee bring claims 
on behalf of a debtor, it takes on the characteristics of a 
trustee). Therefore, in this case, the bankruptcy laws 
authorize the Committee to "commence and prosecute any 
action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any 
tribunal." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6009; cf. 11 U.S.C. SS 1207, 
1306. "Such actions . . . fall into two categories: (1) those 
brought by the trustee as successor to the debtor's interest 
included in the estate under Section 541, and (2) those 
brought under one or more of the trustee's avoiding 
powers." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P 323.03[2] (15th rev. ed. 
2001). The trustee's "avoiding" powers are not implicated 
here, as they relate to the trustee's power to resist pre- 
bankruptcy transfers of property. 
 
Instead, the Committee brings claims against Lafferty as 
a successor to Walnut and ELCOA's interest. Section 541 
covers such claims. Under section 541, the bankruptcy 
estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement" of bankruptcy. 11 
U.S.C. S 541(a) (emphasis added); see also O'Dowd v. 
Trueger, 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000). These legal and 
equitable interests include causes of action. 3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 323.02[1]; accord O'Dowd, 233 F.3d at 202- 
03. Given these provisions, we have held that "in actions 
brought by the trustee as successor to the debtor's interest 
under section 541, the `trustee stands in the shoes of the 
debtor and can only assert those causes of action 
possessed by the debtor. [Conversely,] [t]he trustee is, of 
course, subject to the same defenses as could have been 
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asserted by the defendant had the action been instituted by 
the debtor.' " Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 323.02[4]). 
 
As these authorities demonstrate, the explicit language of 
section 541 directs courts to evaluate defenses as they 
existed at the commencement of the bankruptcy. This 
direction is entirely consistent with the legislative history. 
The Senate Report to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
made clear that the appropriate frame of reference for 
section 541 is the state of the debtor as of the 
commencement of the bankruptcy: 
 
       Though [section 541] will include choses in action and 
       claims by the debtor against others, it is not intended 
       to expand the debtor's rights against others more than 
       they exist at the commencement of the case. For 
       example, if the debtor has a claim that is barred at the 
       time of the commencement of the case by the statute 
       of limitations, then the trustee would not be able to 
       pursue that claim, because he too would be barred. He 
       could take no greater rights than the debtor himself 
       had. 
 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in  1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868 (capitals in the original omitted). 
The House Report contains identical language. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977), reprinted in  1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323. 
 
The answer to our first question should now be apparent. 
The Committee asks us to consider post-petition events, 
namely, the removal of the Shapiro family and their co- 
conspirators from the Debtors' management, as well as the 
Committee's status as an innocent successor, when 
weighing the equities of the in pari delicto defense. The 
plain language of section 541, however, prevents courts 
from taking into account events that occur after the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. As a result, we 
must evaluate the in pari delicto defense without regard to 
whether the Committee is an innocent successor. See Bank 
of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) ("The trustee 
succeeds only to such rights as the bankrupt possessed; 
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and the trustee is subject to all claims and defenses which 
might have been asserted against the bankruptcy but for 
the filing of the petition."); Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. 
Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 495 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(stating that it is a "fundamental principle that the estate 
succeeds only to the nature and the rights of the property 
interest that the debtor possessed pre-petition"). 
 
We thus agree with the analysis of the Tenth Circuit in In 
re: Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281 (10th 
Cir. 1996), which employed section 541 in applying the in 
pari delicto doctrine to bar a bankruptcy trustee's suit 
against a third-party. In Hedged-Investments, an individual 
ran a Ponzi scheme through a solely owned corporation and 
three limited partnerships. After the scheme collapsed, the 
corporation and the partnerships went into bankruptcy. A 
bankruptcy trustee was appointed over the four entities, 
and the trustee subsequently brought suit on behalf of the 
debtors against third-party investors who had profited from 
the Ponzi scheme. See id. at 1282. The district court 
applied the in pari delicto defense and dismissed the suit. 
See id. 
 
The trustee argued before the Tenth Circuit, as the 
Committee does here, that his status as a bankruptcy 
trustee prevented the application of the in pari delicto 
defense. In support, he cited Scholes v. Lehmann , a case in 
which the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the defense to 
bar a receiver from bringing fraudulent conveyance actions 
on behalf of the debtor corporations against third-parties 
and others who had received funds from the corporations. 
See 56 F.3d at 754-55. The Scholes court's holding rested 
on the rationale that the appointment of the innocent 
receiver had removed the wrongdoer from the scene and 
changed the equities such that the in pari delicto doctrine 
"los[t] its sting." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the trustee's argument and 
held that the trustee could not bring suit against the third- 
party investors because "one who has himself participated 
in a violation of law cannot be permitted to assert . . . any 
right founded upon . . . the illegal transaction." Hedged- 
Investments, 84 F.3d at 1284 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). It reasoned that, while the Seventh 
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Circuit's reasoning in Scholes might be preferable from a 
public policy perspective, it did not comport with the plain 
language of section 541, which explicitly provided that the 
bankruptcy estate "is comprised of . . . all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case." Id. at 1285. The court explained the 
significance of that language: 
 
       We emphasize [that] S 541(a)(1) limits estate property to 
       the debtor's interests "as of the commencement of the 
       case." This phrase places both temporal and qualitative 
       limitations on the reach of the bankruptcy estate. In a 
       temporal sense, it establishes a clear-cut date after 
       which property acquired by the debtor will normally 
       not become property of the bankruptcy estate. In a 
       qualitative sense, the phrase establishes the estate's 
       rights as no stronger than they were when actually 
       held by the debtor. Congress intended the trustee to 
       stand in the shoes of the debtor and "take no greater 
       rights than the debtor himself had." Therefore, to the 
       extent [that the trustee] must rely on 11 U.S.C. S 541 
       for his standing in this case, he may not use his status 
       as trustee to insulate the partnership from . . . 
       wrongdoing . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
       Neither the text of the [Bankruptcy] Code nor its 
       legislative history suggests any exceptions to the 
       principle that the strength of an estate's cause of 
       action is measured by how it stood "as of 
       commencement of the case." 
 
Id. at 1285-86 (citations omitted). 
 
We note that the Tenth Circuit is not alone. Both the 
Second and Sixth Circuits have also applied the in pari 
delicto doctrine to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee, 
standing in the shoes of a debtor, against third-parties, 
without regard to the trustee's status as an innocent 
successor. See Dublin Secs., 133 F.3d at 380 (applying Ohio 
law); Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093- 
94 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Connecticut law); Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 
1991) (applying New York law); see also The Mediators, 105 
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F.3d at 825-27 (summarizing Hirsch and Wagoner and 
applying New York law to find that a bankruptcy trustee 
has no standing to assert claims against third-parties for 
cooperating in the very misconduct that the debtor had 
initiated). Our research reveals no courts that hold 
otherwise in the bankruptcy context. 
 
We certainly acknowledge that, in the receivership 
context, several courts have declined to apply in pari delicto 
to bar the receiver from asserting the claims of an insolvent 
corporation on the ground that application of the doctrine 
to an innocent successor would be inequitable. These 
courts have thought it proper to consider events arising 
after a corporation enters into receivership. See, e.g., FDIC 
v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) 
("While a party may itself be denied a right or defense on 
account of its misdeeds, there is little reason to impose the 
same punishment on . . . [an] innocent entity that steps 
into the party's shoes pursuant to court order or operation 
of law."); Scholes, 56 F.3d at 754 (stating that "the defense 
of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person who is in 
pari delicto is eliminated"). These cases are easily 
distinguishable, however; unlike bankruptcy trustees, 
receivers are not subject to the limits of section 541. 
 
B. 
 
The second question we must answer is whether, viewing 
the Committee as if it had brought its claims as of the 
commencement of the bankruptcy, as section 541 
commands, the Shapiro family's conduct should, in fact, be 
imputed to the Debtors such that the doctrine of in pari 
delicto bars the Committee's claims. While bankruptcy law 
mandates that the trustee step into the shoes of the debtor 
when asserting causes of action, state law generally 
provides the substantive law governing imputation for state 
law claims. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 
84, 85, 87-89 (1994) (holding, in the FDIC receivership 
context, that, without an "explicit federal statutory 
provision" or special federal interest, state law"governs the 
imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged 
negligence"). 
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Under the law of imputation, courts impute the fraud of 
an officer to a corporation when the officer commits the 
fraud (1) in the course of his employment, and (2) for the 
benefit of the corporation. See Waslow v. Grant Thornton (In 
re Jack Greenberg, Inc.), 212 B.R. 76, 83 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1997) (citing Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 
884 (3d Cir. 1975), and deriving a federal rule that is 
consistent with Pennsylvania law); see also Nat'l Bank of 
Shamokin v. Waynseboro Knitting Co., 172 A. 131, 134 (Pa. 
1934) (describing Pennsylvania agency law). 
 
The allegations in the Amended Complaint leave no doubt 
that the first part of the imputation test is satisfied -- the 
fraud allegedly perpetrated by the Shapiro family took place 
in the course of their employment for the Debtors. As the 
District Court explained: 
 
       William Shapiro is the sole shareholder of Walnut 
       Associates, Inc, which in turn owns debtor Walnut, 
       which owns debtor ELCOA. William Shapiro is 
       president and a director of the debtors. Kenneth 
       Shapiro is debtors' vice-president and a director. 
       Defendants Walnut Associates, William Shapiro, P.C., 
       Welco, Financial Data, and Kenner Collection Agency, 
       which are owned by William Shapiro, are alleged to 
       have played a role in the fraudulent certificate 
       offerings. The debtor corporations are alleged to have 
       been part of the Shapiro Organization -- i.e. , owned 
       and controlled by the Shapiros. 
 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, No. 99-526, slip. 
op. at 10 (citations omitted). The Committee's central 
allegation, that the Shapiros "were able to perpetuate their 
fraudulent scheme for years through the assistance of 
several `affiliated' companies, including Walnut[and] 
ELCOA," demonstrates the relationship described by the 
District Court. 
 
The second part of the imputation test -- whether 
fraudulent conduct was perpetrated for the benefit of the 
debtor corporation -- is often analyzed under the"adverse 
interest exception." Under this exception, fraudulent 
conduct will not be imputed if the officer's interests were 
adverse to the corporation and "not for the benefit of the 
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corporation." See Waslow, 212 B.R. at 84 (citing Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1155-56 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994)); see also Solomon v. Gibson, 615 A.2d 367 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (same). 
 
The Committee argues that the Shapiro family's fraud 
was adverse to the interests of the Debtors, and indeed, 
caused damage to them through "deepening insolvency." 
Thus, the Committee maintains that the Shapiros did not 
act for the benefit of the Debtors and their fraudulent 
conduct cannot be imputed to those corporations. However, 
even assuming that the Shapiros' interests were adverse to 
the Debtors' interests, the Committee cannot prevail 
because the "adverse interest exception" is itself subject to 
an exception -- the "sole actor" exception. The general 
principle of the "sole actor" exception provides that, if an 
agent is the sole representative of a principal, then that 
agent's fraudulent conduct is imputable to the principal 
regardless of whether the agent's conduct was adverse to 
the principal's interests. See Waslow, 212 B.R. at 86. The 
rationale for this rule is that the sole agent has no one to 
whom he can impart his knowledge, or from whom he can 
conceal it, and that the corporation must bear the 
responsibility for allowing an agent to act without 
accountability. See id. (citing First National Bank of Cicero 
v. Lewco Secs. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 
1988) and William M. Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations S 827.10, at 160 (perm. ed. 
rev. vol. 1994)). Pennsylvania has recognized the"sole 
actor" exception. See Gordon v. Continental Cas. Co., 181 A. 
574, 577 (Pa. 1935). 
 
The "sole actor" exception has been applied to cases in 
which the agent who committed the fraud was also the sole 
shareholder of the corporation. See, e.g., In re Mediators, 
105 F.3d at 827. Courts have additionally applied the 
exception to cases in which the agent "dominated" the 
corporation. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Hous. Mortgage Corp., 
899 F. Supp. 1399, 1405-06 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing 
corporation's claims against accountants because sole 
shareholders and officers of corporation participated in 
alleged fraud). 
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In the present case, the Shapiros clearly dominated 
Walnut and ELCOA. They were the sole representatives in 
the alleged fraud with Lafferty. Additionally, William 
Shapiro was the sole shareholder. And, according to the 
Amended Complaint, the Shapiros dominated the 
ownership and control of Walnut and ELCOA. Thus, the 
"sole actor" exception applies. Further, we reject the 
Committee's argument that the exception should not apply 
because several of the Debtors' directors merely acted 
negligently and did not perpetrate the fraud. The possible 
existence of any innocent independent directors does not 
alter the fact that the Shapiros controlled and dominated 
the Debtors. See Vail Nat'l Bank v. Finkelman , 800 P.2d 
1342, 1345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (acknowledging that 
domination justifies invocation of the "sole actor" 
exception); FDIC v. Nat'l Surety Corp., 281 N.W.2d 816, 821 
(Iowa 1979) (doctrine applies to board of directors or 
corporation subject to agent's control). 
 
In sum, we will impute the fraudulent conduct of the 
Shapiros to the Debtors because the Shapiros perpetrated 
the alleged fraud in the course of their employment, and 
because, although the Shapiros may have acted adversely 
to the interests of the Debtors, they were the sole actors 
engaged in the alleged fraudulent conduct. Viewing the 
claim as of the commencement of bankruptcy, we find that 
the in pari delicto doctrine bars the Committee, standing in 
the shoes of the Debtors, from bringing its claims against 
Lafferty. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
In this case we confront a regrettably common scenario. 
Using a type of Ponzi scheme, William and Kenneth Shapiro 
along with others fraudulently induced the appellant to 
invest in the Shapiros' companies long past the point where 
those companies could repay the funds. In the ensuing 
bankruptcy, the appellant formed a creditors' committee 
and, acting as the equivalent of a bankruptcy trustee, 
sought to recover some of its losses by pursuing claims that 
the debtor corporations have against various professionals, 
such as accountants and underwriters, who allegedly 
facilitated the Shapiros' fraud. The majority holds that 
these creditors -- and indeed any creditors in a case like 
this -- are barred from obtaining relief in bankruptcy from 
the professionals. I believe the majority's reasoning rests on 
a mistaken interpretation of the bankruptcy code, 
needlessly thwarts recovery for innocent creditors, and 
insulates from civil liability those who help perpetrate 
fraud. Under the majority's reasoning, no matter how 
egregious the conduct is of a professional who facilitated a 
fraudulent sale of securities, creditors cannot recover from 
that professional in the likely event that the corporation 
winds up in bankruptcy. 
 
Despite my disagreement with the outcome reached by 
the majority, I agree with much of the majority's reasoning. 
In particular, I agree with the majority that the creditors' 
committee has standing to sue. The creditors' committee 
received an assignment of the debtor corporations' claims, 
and it is well settled that an "assignee of a claim has 
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the 
assignor." Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 
1863 (2000). The question then reverts to whether the 
debtor corporations have standing. As the majority points 
out, a corporation has a distinct legal existence from its 
officers and owners, and economic losses wrongfully 
suffered by a corporation are sufficient injuries to confer 
standing. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins , 397 U.S. 159, 90 
S.Ct. 832 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co. , 390 U.S. 1, 
88 S.Ct. 651 (1968); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 
309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693 (1940). The only reason to 
 
                                30 
  
suppose that a corporation lacks standing in a case like 
this one is that there is an allegedly valid affirmative 
defense available against the corporation's claims. But as a 
general matter, the ultimate merits of an affirmative 
defense do not raise questions about a plaintiff 's standing, 
or else the moment the court was poised to rule in favor of 
the defendant on the affirmative defense, the court would 
lose jurisdiction and there would be no binding judgment. 
Moreover, as I explain below, I think the defense fails in 
this case. 
 
Like the majority, I agree that in evaluating the 
affirmative defense at issue here -- the in pari delicto 
doctrine -- we apply state law for the plaintiffs' state causes 
of action, see O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 
83-85, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 2052-53 (1994), and federal law for 
federal causes of action. Id. (citing Schact v. Brown, 711 
F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983)). And I also agree with the 
majority that, regardless of whether federal or state (in this 
case Pennsylvania) law is applied, the in pari delicto 
doctrine is best understood as a broad equitable principle 
that encompasses a variety of different, more specific legal 
rules and defenses drawn from torts, contracts, or other 
areas of law depending on the underlying cause of action at 
issue. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 
453-54 (7th Cir. 1982). Broadly, the idea behind in pari 
delicto is that "a plaintiff who has participated in 
wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the 
wrongdoing." Black's Law Dictionary 794 (7th ed. 1999). 
 
Because the wrongdoers here were officers of the debtor 
corporations, a special case of the in pari delicto doctrine 
comes into play -- the standards covering when to impute 
the acts of a corporation's officers to the corporation itself. 
If those officers remain in control of the corporation or 
stand to benefit from any recovery, then the officers' 
conduct plainly would be imputed to the corporation. See, 
e.g., Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455-56; Rochez Bros., Inc. v. 
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 
But, as Judge Posner has explained, the equitable 
principles underlying the doctrines of imputing misconduct 
and in pari delicto lead to a different result when the 
miscreant officers are removed and no wrongdoer will 
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receive the benefit of recovery. See Scholes v. Lehman, 56 
F.3d 750, 753-55 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing McCandless v. 
Furland, 296 U.S. 140, 160, 56 S.Ct. 41, 47 (1935) 
(Cardozo, J.)). No longer will it be true that, as Black's 
definition puts it, one "who has participated in wrongdoing 
[will] . . . recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing." 
Instead, allowing the corporation to impose liability on 
professionals who wrongfully facilitated the fraud will both 
help deter that professional misconduct and help 
compensate victims who may otherwise go away empty- 
handed. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this point as well 
and refused to apply in pari delicto when the recovery would 
not benefit the wrongdoers. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 
F.3d 17, 18, (9th Cir. 1995). Nothing suggests that 
Pennsylvania would interpret in pari delicto and the rules of 
imputation differently than the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
have. 
 
As I understand the majority, they accept that if the 
wrongdoers within a corporation are removed and the 
benefit of the recovery will ultimately help victims of the 
fraud, then the corporation can proceed with its claims. 
The reason the majority concludes nevertheless that the 
creditors' committee is barred from recovery is that at the 
moment the bankruptcy petition was filed, the majority 
maintains that the wrongdoers had not actually been 
removed yet. The majority's argument tracks a Tenth 
Circuit decision, In re Hedge-Investments Assoc., Inc., 84 
F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 196). That case refused to follow 
Scholes and the Ninth Circuit's decision in O'Melveny, 
which both involved receiverships, because the Tenth 
Circuit thought that a contrary result was compelled by a 
provision in the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. S 541(a). The 
court explained that under S 541(a) the debtor's estate is 
formed at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. Since 
the bad corporate officers were only removed post-petition, 
the court reasoned that S 541(a) dictates that the removal 
cannot be considered. That is, because the officers were 
still in control at the moment the petition was filed, in pari 
delicto still erected a bar at that moment. 84 F.3d at 1285. 
 
There are a number of problems with this reasoning. The 
first and most obvious is that, whatever the inflexibility is 
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of the bankruptcy code, an equitable doctrine like in pari 
delicto is highly sensitive to the facts and readily adapted to 
achieve equitable results. What is sufficient to satisfy the 
doctrine, in other words, need not be parsed like a statute. 
Even if we assume that we can look no further than the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, it can scarcely be denied 
that as soon as the Shapiros' companies were placed in 
bankruptcy, the Shapiros lost any ability to benefit further 
from their Ponzi scheme. The bankruptcy court would not 
have allowed itself to become an instrument of their fraud. 
Some time, of course, would elapse before the full process 
of bankruptcy proceedings took their course, but there is 
nothing in the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto that 
insists those formalities must be completed before the 
doctrine is triggered. 
 
The point of equitable doctrines is to avoid injustice 
caused by overly inflexible rules: equity is "[t]he recourse to 
principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as 
applied to particular circumstances." Black's Law 
Dictionary 560 (7th ed. 1999). Here the majority injects a 
pointless technicality into an equitable doctrine. For 
example, one court has distinguished the Tenth Circuit's 
decision that the majority follows by noting that if the 
debtor corporation is placed in receivership prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, there is no in pari delicto 
bar on an action by the corporation. See, e.g. , Hanover 
Corp. of America v. Beckner, 221 B.R. 849, 859 (M.D. La. 
1997). It is difficult to understand what is accomplished by 
forcing future plaintiffs to take that extra step or denying 
these plaintiffs relief because they failed to take it. Equity 
does not turn on that kind of empty technicality. 
 
A second problem with the majority's reasoning is that, 
while it is certainly true that a trustee (or a creditor's 
committee acting as trustee) assumes the same causes of 
action and is subject to the same defenses as the debtor, 
see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101, 87 S.Ct. 
274, 276 (1966); Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Serv. Support 
Specialities, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 495 (3d Cir. 1997), that 
rule does not mandate that in evaluating a trustee's claims 
on behalf of an estate, post-petition events can never be 
considered. Segal v. Rochell, 382 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 511 
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(1966). The rule that the trustee must be restricted to the 
debtor's causes of action and is subject to the same 
defenses as the debtor does not mandate that post-petition 
events are never considered in evaluating those causes of 
action and defenses inherited by the trustee. 
 
In Segal, the question before the Court was whether a 
trustee could claim as property of the estate a tax loss- 
carryback refund for a taxable year that ended post- 
petition. Significantly, even though under the Internal 
Revenue Code the refund could not be claimed until the 
end of the taxable year, which occurred after the petition 
date, the Supreme Court agreed with the trustee that the 
refund was property of the estate. The refund was 
"sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little 
entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an 
unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 
"property." 382 U.S. at 380, 86 S.Ct. at 514. 
 
So too in this case the losses suffered by the debtor 
corporation all took place before the bankruptcy and the 
only obstacle to the corporations' recovery is the removal of 
the Shapiros, an event as inevitable as that completion of 
the taxable year in Segal. More important, since our case 
involves corporations, there is no concern about the 
competing fresh-start policy for individuals that the 
Supreme Court had to weigh in Segal. Corporations do not 
get fresh starts. 
 
One last point is worth noting parenthetically. Under the 
majority's logic, the claims brought by the creditors' 
committee against the Shapiros themselves and other 
corporate insiders should be barred as well as the claims 
against the outside professionals. After all, the corporations 
and the insiders were as much in pari delicto  as the 
corporation and the outside professionals. The District 
Court did not dismiss the claims against the insiders, but 
inexplicably failed to explain why those creditors' claims, 
which apparently were also on behalf of the corporation, 
were not subject to the same reasoning that the court 
applied in dismissing the claims against Lafferty. Although 
the claims against the insiders are not properly before us, 
having been severed below to create a final judgment, it is 
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especially disturbing that the majority's reasoning applies 
with equal force to them. 
 
In short, the majority's position retards the normal goals 
of tort law, misinterprets equitable doctrine, and reads the 
bankruptcy code too narrowly. I dissent. 
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